David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The status of premise 1 is controversial: friends of two dimensional modal logic (and others) will be reluctant to grant that the proposition that I exist is both contingent and knowable a priori (even by me). Instead, they will insist that all that I know a priori is that the sentence "I exist" expresses some true proposition or other when I token it. But, of course, even that will suffice for the purposes of the argument. Provided that I know a priori that the sentence "I exist" expresses some true singular proposition or other -i.e. some proposition or other which contains an individual -then I have an a priori guarantee that there are some individuals, and so I am entitled to assert 2. Of course, it will remain true that there are some people who refuse to accept 2: consider, for example, those ontological nihilists who think that the proper logical form of every sentence can be given in a feature placing language.  However, many people will be prepared to grant that we can know a priori that there are at least some individuals -and that it enough to sustain interest in our argument to this point.
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