David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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At p.23, Leftow argues that, as a matter of physical necessity, no parcel of matter follows a discontinuous spatial path. He then uses this conclusion as a premise in a further argument to the conclusion that no non-theistic scenarios involving contingently existing entities could yield a sure way to gain evidence that a second time series exists. I think that there may be non-theistic scenarios involving contingently existing entities which yield ways of gaining evidence of other time series -- it could be for example that our best theories about the very early universe entail that there are many disconnected regions of spacetime, each with its own time series -- so I think that the further argument cannot be any good. However, the point I want to insist on here is that his argument for the conclusion that, as a matter of physical necessity no parcel of matter follows a discontinuous spatial path, is seriously flawed.
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