The Certainty of Skepticism

Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:125-128 (1980)
Carrier in a recent paper urges for consideration an argument for skepticism which is based on premises one of which in turn is to be defended by yet another principle (the "Janus Principle" of the text). We feel that the latter principle and the way Carrier wants to use it to defend his skeptical argument will find adherents, but we show that this argument rests on an interesting equivocation quite beyond repair even if we accept the "Janus Principle".
Keywords Epistemology  Skepticism
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DOI 10.5840/gps19801128
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