Explaining what people say about sensory qualia

Abstract There is an argument promulgated by certain philosophers (notably Dennett 1988, 1991), claiming that from a logical and philosophical point of view the notion of "qualia" makes no sense. On the other hand, other philosophers (e.g. Nagel 1974, Peacocke 1983, and Block 1990) say that qualia must exist since otherwise there would be "nothing it's like" to have sensations: we humans would merely be empty vessels making movements and interacting with our environments, but there would be no inside "feel" to anything
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