David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 57 (2):177–190 (2003)
This paper presents an anti‐realist account of fictional objects. Arguing for the involvement of non‐veridical prepositional attitude ascriptions in the understanding of fiction, I maintain that there is no need to invoke Meinongian objects, possibilia or abstract objects for this purpose. In addition I argue against object dependent views . I make a case for empty names playing a more significant role than that accorded on direct reference accounts of names. I close by noting points of similarity and of difference with Amie Thomasson and with Kendall Walton
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References found in this work BETA
A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.) (2000). Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic Print on Demand.
John Searle (1985). Expression and Meaning. Cambridge University Press.
Amie L. Thomasson (1999). Fiction and Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.
Kendall L. Walton (1990). Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Harvard University Press.
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