David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 57 (2):177–190 (2003)
This paper presents an anti‐realist account of fictional objects. Arguing for the involvement of non‐veridical prepositional attitude ascriptions in the understanding of fiction, I maintain that there is no need to invoke Meinongian objects, possibilia or abstract objects for this purpose. In addition I argue against object dependent views . I make a case for empty names playing a more significant role than that accorded on direct reference accounts of names. I close by noting points of similarity and of difference with Amie Thomasson and with Kendall Walton.
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References found in this work BETA
Kendall L. Walton (1990). Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Harvard University Press.
Amie L. Thomasson (1999). Fiction and Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.
John Searle (1985). Expression and Meaning. Cambridge University Press.
A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.) (2000). Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic Print on Demand.
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