No evidence for neural filling-in – vision as an illusion – pinning down “enaction”

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):767-768 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

(1) The purported evidence for neural filling-in is not evidence for filling-in, but just for long-range dynamic interactions. (2) Vision is perhaps not an “illusion,” but at any rate it is not “pictorial.” (3) The idea of the “world as an outside memory” as well as MacKay's “conditional readiness for action” may help approach an “enactive” theory of vision.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Neural codes for conscious vision.Dominic H. Ffytche - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (12):493-495.
Filling-in as a within-level propagation may be an illusion.Talis Bachmann - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):749-750.
Prediction, inference, and the homunculus.Horace B. Barlow - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):750-751.
We can't fill in answers to philosophical questions.Lloyd Kaufman - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):760-761.
The moon illusion.Frances Egan - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):604-23.
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
29 (#472,004)

6 months
2 (#658,848)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references