A Note on Analysis and Circular Definitions

Grazer Philosophische Studien 54:107-113 (1998)
Analyses, in the simplest form assertions that aim to capture an intimate link between two concepts, are viewed since Russell's theory of definite descriptions as analyzing descriptions. Analysis therefore has to obey the laws governing definitions including some form of a Substitutivity Principle (SP). Once (SP) is accepted the road to the paradox of analysis is open. Popular reactions to the paradox involve the fundamental assumption (SV) that sentences differing only in containing an analysandum resp. an analysans express the same proposition, because analysandum and analysans are the same entity. Following suggestions of Gupta and Belnap it is argued that (SV) should be rejected
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/gps19985428
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,904
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Francesco Orilia (2000). Meaning and Circular Definitions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):155-169.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

67 ( #48,839 of 1,725,449 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #110,437 of 1,725,449 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.