Belief representation in a deductivist type-free doxastic logic

Minds and Machines 4 (2):163-203 (1994)
Konolige''s technical notion of belief based on deduction structures is briefly reviewed and its usefulness for the design of artificial agents with limited representational and deductive capacities is pointed out. The design of artificial agents with more sophisticated representational and deductive capacities is then taken into account. Extended representational capacities require in the first place a solution to the intensional context problems. As an alternative to Konolige''s modal first-order language, an approach based on type-free property theory is proposed. It considers often neglected issues, such as the need for a more general account of thede dicto-de re distinction, and quasi-indicators. Extended deductive capacities require a subdivision of Konolige''s notion of belief into two distinct technical notions,potential anddispositional belief. The former has to do with what an artificial agent could in principle come to actively believe, given enough time and its specific logical competence; the latter with what an agent can be assumed to believe with respect to a specific goal to be fulfilled.
Keywords Artificial agent  belief  doxastic logic  intensional logic  logical omniscience  multiagent domain  semantic representation  type-free property theory
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    Hector-Neri Castaneda (1980). Reference, Reality and Perceptual Fields. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 53 (August):763-823.

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