David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 160 (3):407-414 (2012)
Dynamic events such as a rolling ball moving from one place to another involve change and time intervals and thus presumably successions of static events occurring one after the other, e.g., the ball’s being at a certain place and then at another place during the interval in question. When dynamic events are experienced they should count as present and thus as existent from a presentist point of view. But this seems to imply the existence of the static events involved in them. This in turn seems to imply that there exist past and perhaps even future static events. Therefore, there is a problem for presentism. A possible way out for the presentist is proposed, based on allowing for time-indexed past-oriented and future-oriented properties. One may raise objections regarding the ontological status of these properties and the commitment to past and future objects and times that they seem to bring with them, but these objections can be put to rest.
|Keywords||Time Presentism Events States Properties|
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas M. Crisp (2007). Presentism and the Grounding Objection. Noûs 41 (1):90–109.
Craig Bourne (2006). A Future for Presentism. Oxford University Press.
Terence Parsons (1990). Events in the Semantics of English: A Study in Subatomic Semantics. The MIT Press.
Simon Keller (2004). Presentism and Truthmaking. In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 1. Oxford University Press 83-104.
Citations of this work BETA
Francesco Orilia (2016). Moderate Presentism. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):589-607.
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