Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):155-169 (2000)
|Abstract||Gupta"s and Belnap"s Revision Theory of Truth defends the legitimacy of circular definitions. Circularity, however, forces us to reconsider our conception of meaning. A readjustment of some standard theses about meaning is here proposed, by relying on a novel version of the sense–reference distinction.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Harold I. Brown (1994). Circular Justifications. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:406 - 414.
Angelika Kratzer (1977). What 'Must' and 'Can' Must and Can Mean. Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.
G. Aldo Antonelli (1992). Revision Rules: An Investigation Into Non-Monotonic Inductive Deﬁnitions. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
P. D. Welch (2001). On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and the Next Stable Set. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.
Claire Horisk (2008). Truth, Meaning, and Circularity. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):269 - 300.
J. A. Burgess (2008). When is Circularity in Definitions Benign? Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):214–233.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #64,434 of 549,550 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,550 )
How can I increase my downloads?