David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Many philosophers of language have held that a truth-conditional semantic account can explain the data motivating the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, but I believe this is a mistake. I argue that these data also motivate what I call “dual-aspect” uses as a distinct but closely related type. After establishing that an account of the distinction must also explain dual-aspect uses, I argue that the truth-conditional Semantic Model of the distinction cannot. Thus, the Semantic Model cannot explain the data for which it is developed and so fails as an account of the referential/attributive distinction.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Maciej Witek (2005). Truth and Conversation. Philosophica 75:103-135.
Kris McDaniel & Ben Bradley (2008). Desires. Mind 117 (466):267 - 302.
Howard K. Wettstein (1983). The Semantic Significance of the Referential-Attributive Distinction. Philosophical Studies 44 (2):187--96.
Kent Bach (2004). Descriptions: Points of Reference. In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Clarendon Press.
Kent Bach (2007). Referentially Used Descriptions: A Reply to Devitt. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (2):33-48.
Edward Kanterian (2011). Kripke's Metalinguistic Apparatus and the Analysis of Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 156 (3):363-387.
A. Bezuidenhout (1997). Pragmatics, Semantic Undetermination and the Referential/Attributive Distinction. Mind 106 (423):375-409.
Thomas D. Bontly (2005). Conversational Implicature and the Referential Use of Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 125 (1):1 - 25.
Michael O'Rourke (1998). Semantics and the Dual-Aspect Use of Definite Descriptions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):264–288.
Genoveva Marti (2008). Direct Reference and Definite Descriptions. Dialectica 62 (1):43–57.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #107,606 of 1,100,875 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #115,533 of 1,100,875 )
How can I increase my downloads?