David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):163-164 (1999)
O'Brien & Opie's admirably sharp hypothesis gains some of its force by ignoring distinctions in murky areas. I attempt to agitate the waters by suggesting that process and vehicle theories are not so different, that classicism can support a vehicle theory, and that several of the key concepts underlying their theory are less clear than depicted. The connection to information I find especially tenuous. Finally, I address the implications of their theory for unconscious thought.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
George N. Reeke (1999). Getting the Vehicle Moving. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):165-166.
Mikko Siponen (2004). A Pragmatic Evaluation of the Theory of Information Ethics. Ethics and Information Technology 6 (4):279-290.
Fernando Martínez-Manrique (2004). Explicitness and Nonconnectionist Vehicle Theories of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):302-303.
Michael S. C. Thomas & Anthony P. Atkinson (1999). Quantities of Qualia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):169-170.
Eoghan Mac Aogáin (1999). Information and Appearance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):159-160.
Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). Putting Content Into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-48.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2004). Vehicle, Process, and Hybrid Theories of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):303-305.
Max Velmans (1999). Neural Activation, Information, and Phenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):172-173.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads1 ( #306,312 of 1,089,047 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,722 of 1,089,047 )
How can I increase my downloads?