What's wrong with Moorean buck-passing?

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has the means to avoid the wrong kind of reasons problem. Further, I counter the common suspicion that a Moorean account cannot make sense of deontological views such as Ross’s, and that it generally leaves no room for agent-relative reasons. In order to do this, I appeal to the idea that a Moorean account does not dictate the substantive view that values have to be maximized. In some cases, expressing them might be a better response. Finally I lay out and reply to a potentially devastating argument to the effect that a Moorean account makes oughts and reasons non-normative. I also criticize Scanlon’s attempt to favour his own buck-passing account via consideration of the open question argument. MBP thus emerges as a live option in the buck-passing debate
Keywords Intrinsic value  Buck-passing  Reasons  Moore  Partiality  Agent-relativity  Normativity
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Dancy (2005). Should We Pass the Buck?. In. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. 33--44.

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Jonas Olson (2006). G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.
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