Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746 (2013)
|Abstract||In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has the means to avoid the wrong kind of reasons problem. Further, I counter the common suspicion that a Moorean account cannot make sense of deontological views such as Ross’s, and that it generally leaves no room for agent-relative reasons. In order to do this, I appeal to the idea that a Moorean account does not dictate the substantive view that values have to be maximized. In some cases, expressing them might be a better response. Finally I lay out and reply to a potentially devastating argument to the effect that a Moorean account makes oughts and reasons non-normative. I also criticize Scanlon’s attempt to favour his own buck-passing account via consideration of the open question argument. MBP thus emerges as a live option in the buck-passing debate|
|Keywords||Intrinsic value Buck-passing Reasons Moore Partiality Agent-relativity Normativity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
S. Matthew Liao (2010). The Buck-Passing Account of Value: Lessons From Crisp. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):421 - 432.
Jonas Olson (2006). G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.
David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (2003). Can Scanlon Avoid Redundancy by Passing the Buck? Analysis 63 (4):328–331.
Jussi Suikkanen (2005). Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.
Jonas Olson (2004). Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.
Guy Fletcher (2012). Resisting Buck-Passing Accounts of Prudential Value. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.
Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006). Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.
Francesco Orsi (2006). Naturalism and the Buck-Passing Account of Value. Philosophical Writings 32:58-77.
Pekka Väyrynen (2006). Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1. Oxford University Press.
Jussi Suikkanen (2009). Buck-Passing Accounts of Value. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779.
Andrew Moore (2012). The Buck-Passing Stops Here. In Rationis Defensor.
R. Jay Wallace (2010). Reasons, Values and Agent-Relativity. Dialectica 64 (4):503-528.
Johan Brännmark (2008). Excellence and Means: On the Limits of Buck-Passing. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):301-315.
Philip Cook (2008). An Augmented Buck-Passing Account of Reasons and Value: Scanlon and Crisp on What Stops the Buck. Utilitas 20 (4):490-507.
Christine Tappolet (2005). Value, Reasons, and Oughts. In Maria E. Reicher & Johan C. Marek (eds.), Experience and Analysis, The Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Öbv&hpt.
Added to index2012-03-06
Total downloads19 ( #71,234 of 722,947 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #17,054 of 722,947 )
How can I increase my downloads?