Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (2):661-672 (1991)
|Abstract||A paradigm of scientific discovery is defined within a first-order logical framework. It is shown that within this paradigm there exists a formal scientist that is Turing computable and universal in the sense that it solves every problem that any scientist can solve. It is also shown that universal scientists exist for no regular logics that extend first-order logic and satisfy the Löwenheim-Skolem condition|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
John D. Norton (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
John D. Norton (2007). Probability Disassembled. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):141 - 171.
Daniel N. Osherson & Scott Weinstein (1988). Finite Axiomatizability and Scientific Discovery. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:409 - 412.
Samir Chopra & Eric Martin (2002). Generalized Logical Consequence: Making Room for Induction in the Logic of Science. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (3):245-280.
F. Bergadano (1993). Machine Learning and the Foundations of Inductive Inference. Minds and Machines 3 (1):31-51.
Stephen Hetherington (2001). Why There Need Not Be Any Grue Problem About Inductive Inference as Such. Philosophy 76 (1):127-136.
John D. Norton (2010). There Are No Universal Rules for Induction. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #246,970 of 740,795 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,957 of 740,795 )
How can I increase my downloads?