On advancing simple hypotheses
Philosophy of Science 57 (2):266-277 (1990)
| Abstract | We consider drawbacks to scientific methods that prefer simple hypotheses to complex ones that cover the same data. The discussion proceeds in the context of a precise model of scientific inquiry | |||||||||
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