The conjunction fallacy: A misunderstanding about conjunction?
| Abstract | It is easy to construct pairs of sentences X, Y that lead many people to ascribe higher probability to the conjunction X-and-Y than to the conjuncts X, Y. Whether an error is thereby committed depends on reasoners’ interpretation of the expressions “probability” and “and.” We report two experiments designed to clarify the normative status of typical responses to conjunction problems. © 2004 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved. | |||||||||
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Nicolao Bonini, Katya Tentori & Daniel Osherson (2004). A Different Conjunction Fallacy. Mind and Language 19 (2):199–210.
Andreas Jarvstad & Ulrike Hahn (2011). Source Reliability and the Conjunction Fallacy. Cognitive Science 35 (4):682-711.
Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori (2008). Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.
Jonah N. Schupbach (2012). Is the Conjunction Fallacy Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation? Synthese 184 (1):13-27.
Stephan Hartmann & Wouter Meijs (2012). Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered. Synthese 184 (1):73-87.
Rodrigo Moro (2009). On the Nature of the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 171 (1).
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