Wanton responsibility

Journal of Ethics 2 (3):261-276 (1998)
Mainstream accounts of responsible agency either overlook or discount wanton agents as plausible candidates for responsible agency. This is largely due to the compatibilist project of such accounts, and to their deemphasis of historical and modal considerations. I argue that wantons – those who are indifferent to the desires that move them to act – can and ought to be counted as responsible agents. Indeed, they deserve special blame for the acts of wrong doing that issue from their wanton behavior.
Keywords free agency  personhood  responsibility  wantons
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DOI 10.1023/A:1009712618620
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