Skepticism about saving the greater number
Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (4):413–426 (2004)
| Abstract | Article | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Véronique Munoz-Dardé (2005). The Distribution of Numbers and the Comprehensiveness of Reasons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):207–233.
Martin Peterson (2009). The Mixed Solution to the Number Problem. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2):166-177.
Paul Kurtz (2010). Exuberant Skepticism. Prometheus Books 59 John Glenn Drive.
Ben Saunders (2009). A Defence of Weighted Lotteries in Life Saving Cases. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):279 - 290.
Katharina Rasmussen (2012). Should the Probabilities Count? Philosophical Studies 159 (2):205-218.
Gerald Lang (2005). Fairness in Life and Death Cases. Erkenntnis 62 (3):321 - 351.
Kirsten Meyer (2006). How to Be Consistent Without Saving the Greater Number. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2):136–146.
Iwao Hirose (2001). Saving the Greater Number Without Combining Claims. Analysis 61 (4):341–342.
Iwao Hirose (2004). Aggregation and Numbers. Utilitas 16 (1):62-79.
Michael Otsuka (2000). Scanlon and the Claims of the Many Versus the One. Analysis 60 (3):288–293.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads22 ( #57,090 of 556,908 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,931 of 556,908 )How can I increase my downloads? |

