Skepticism about saving the greater number

Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (4):413–426 (2004)
Abstract
Suppose that each of the following four conditions obtains: 1. You can save either a greater or a lesser number of innocent people from (equally) serious harm. 2. You can do so at trivial cost to yourself. 3. If you act to save, then the harm you prevent is harm that would not have been prevented if you had done nothing. 4. All other things are equal. A skeptic about saving the greater number rejects the common-sensical claim that you have a duty to save the greater number in such circumstances
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DOI 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2004.00020.x
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References found in this work BETA
Larry S. Temkin (1996). A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (3):175–210.
Stuart Rachels (1998). Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Better Than. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):71 – 83.
Gregory S. Kavka (1979). The Numbers Should Count. Philosophical Studies 36 (3):285 - 294.

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