David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 22 (1):41-58 (2009)
A critical examination of Parfit's attempt to reconcile Kantian contractualism with consequentialism, which disputes his contention that the contracting parties would lack decisive reasons to choose principles that ground prohibitions against harming of the sort to which non-consequentialists have been attracted. 1.
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Christopher Woodard (2013). The Common Structure of Kantianism and Act-Utilitarianism. Utilitas 25 (2):246-265.
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