Why it matters that some are worse off than others: An argument against the priority view

Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2):171-199 (2009)
We argue that there is a marked shift in the moral weight of an increment in a person's well-being when one moves from a case involving only intra-personal trade-offs to a case involving only inter-personal trads-offs. This shift, we propose, is required by the separateness of persons. We also argue that the Priority View put forward by Parfit cannot account for such a shift. We also outline two alternative views, an egalitarian view and a claims-based view, that can account for this shift.
Keywords Prioritarianism  Egalitarianism  Competing Claims  Equality
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DOI 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01154.x
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Matthew Rendall (2013). Priority and Desert. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):939-951.

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