David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):764-769 (1994)
Charles Chihara has presented a problem he claims Bayesian confirmation theory cannot handle. Chihara gives examples in which he claims the change in belief cannot be construced as conditionalizing on new evidence. These are situations in which the agent suddenly thinks of new possibilities. I propose a solution that incorporates the important ideas of Bayesian theory. In particular, I present a principle which shows that the change of belief in Chihara's example is due to simple conditionalization.
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