Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability

Synthese 152 (1):81 - 93 (2006)
Philosophers have often attempted to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze probability. This article focuses on counterfactual analyzes of epistemic probability by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen. I argue that a certain type of counterfactual situation creates problems for these analyses. I then argue that Plantinga's intuition about the role of warrant in epistemic probability is mistaken. Both van Inwagen's and Plantinga's intuitions about epistemic probability are flawed.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/20118837
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Alvin Plantinga (1982). How to Be an Anti-Realist. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 56 (1):47 - 70.

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