Indeterminism, counterfactuals, and causation

Philosophy of Science 54 (1):45-62 (1987)
Abstract
In this paper I wish to argue that counterfactual analyses of causation are inadequate. I believe the counterfactuals that are involved in counterfactual analyses of causation are often false, and thus the theories do not provide an adequate account of causation. This is demonstrated by the presentation of a counterexample to the counterfactual analyses of causation. I then present a unified theory of causation that is based upon probability and counterfactuals. This theory accounts for both deterministic and indeterministic causation, and is not subject to many of the traditional problems facing theories of causation
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Citations of this work BETA
Del Ratzsch (1988). Explanation, Subjunctives and Statistical Theories. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (1):80-96.
David Sapire (1991). General Causation. Synthese 86 (3):321 - 347.
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