David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):689-712 (2014)
Like their contemporary counterparts, early modern philosophers find themselves in a predicament. On one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that sensations are representations. For there seems to be nothing in the world for them to represent. On the other hand, some sensory representations seem to be required for us to experience bodies. How else could one perceive the boundaries of a body, except by means of different shadings of color? I argue that Nicolas Malebranche offers an extreme -- and ultimately unworkable -- attempt to solve this riddle. Most commentators claim that Malebranche defends an adverbial theory of sensation, according to which a sensation is merely a way in which an act of sensing happens. The adverbial reading is wrong, or so I argue. Once we arrive at a more accurate reading, we shall see that his position is much more strange than is currently thought. Nevertheless, Malebranche’s view is similar to the adverbial theory in one respect, albeit it at a very high level of generality. His view thus inherits two of the main problems that afflict adverbial theories. Although Malebranche fails to solve them, his ingenious attempts to do so are instructive
|Keywords||Malebranche sensation intentionality representation|
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References found in this work BETA
Laurence BonJour, Epistemological Problems of Perception. Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Laurence BonJour (2004). In Search of Direct Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):349-367.
John Cottingham (2000). And the Objects of Thought. In Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge. 131.
René Descartes (1984). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge University Press.
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