Schlesinger and Miracles

Faith and Philosophy 10 (1):93-98 (1993)
Abstract
George Schlesinger has recently presented a reply to Hume’s argument concerning miracles. Schlesinger argues that probability theory and some simple assumptions about miracles show that testimony for a miracle increases the probability of God existing; furthermore this testimony can raise the probability of God existing enough that it is rational to believe that God exists. I argue that one of the assumptions that Schlesinger makes is false, and that the justification Schlesinger gives for it does not succeed. Thus I claim Schlesinger’s reply to Hume fails
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Citations of this work BETA
William Roche (2012). A Weaker Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):111-118.
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