What is Locke's Theory of Representation?

Abstract
On a currently popular reading of Locke, an idea represents its cause, or what God intended to be its cause. Against Martha Bolton and my former self (among others), I argue that Locke cannot hold such a view, since it sins against his epistemology and theory of abstraction. I argue that Locke is committed to a resemblance theory of representation, with the result that ideas of secondary qualities are not representations
Keywords Locke  intentionality  Martha Bolton  externalism  teleosemantics
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