David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studia Logica 40 (1):67 - 74 (1981)
The essence of the meaning of a declarative sentence is given by stating its truth conditions, and consequently semantics, the study of meaning, must include a theory of truth conditions. Such a theory must not only describe accurately the truth conditions of declarative sentences, it must also answer the question of when two sentences have the same truth conditions. The fundamental semantic relation of having the same truth conditions cannot be ignored by any reasonable theory.This paper is an attempt to find a partial account of this relation by using game theoretical semantics as developed by Hintikka and his followers. The account given will establish a connection between this approach to semantics and the theory of firstdegree entailment formulated by Anderson and Belnap.
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