Causes and Coincidences

Cambridge University Press (1992)
In an important departure from current theories of causation, David Owens proposes that coincidences have no causes, and that a cause is something that ensures that its effects are no coincidence. He elucidates the idea of a coincidence as an event that can be divided into constituent events, the nomological antecedents of which are independent of each other. He also suggests that causal facts can be analyzed in terms of non-causal facts, including relations of necessity. Thus, causation is defined in terms of coincidence, and coincidence without reference to causation. In a book that will be of particular interest to those concerned with the role of causation in the philosophy of mind, David Owens challenges ideas of Hume, Davidson and Lewis, and offers novel solutions to the problems still confronting theorists of causation.
Keywords Causation  Coincidence
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Call number BD541.O84 1992
ISBN(s) 0521044480   9780521416504   0521416507  
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Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
Benjamin Schnieder & Alex Steinberg (2015). Without Reason? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):n/a-n/a.

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