Content, causation, and psychophysical supervenience

Philosophy of Science 60 (2):242-61 (1993)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There is a growing acceptance of the idea that the explanatory states of folk psychology do not supervene on the physical. Even Fodor (1987) seems to grant as much. He argues, however, that this cannot be true of theoretical psychology. Since theoretical psychology offers causal explanations, its explanatory states must be taxonomized in such a way as to supervene on the physical. I use this concession to invert his argument and cast doubt on the received model of folk psychological explanation as causal explanation by intentionally individuated states. This in turn undermines the central model of cognitive theory--causal explanation by representational states

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mental causation: Sustaining and dynamic.Robert N. Audi - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Content, causal powers, and context.Keith Butler - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (1):105-14.
Content, causation, and cognitive science.David Braun - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):375-89.
Supervenience and supervenient causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22 (S1):45-56.
Psychophysical supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (January):51-70.
Content and causal powers.Eric Saidel - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):658-65.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
226 (#81,026)

6 months
33 (#90,679)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joseph Owens
University of Minnesota

Citations of this work

Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Content and causal powers.Eric Saidel - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):658-65.
Alternative individualism.Denis M. Walsh - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):628-648.
Content, causal powers, and context.Keith Butler - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (1):105-14.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
Psychophysical supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (January):51-70.

View all 10 references / Add more references