David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press (2008)
Philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. I agree that we have this sort of control over our actions and that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness. But I deny that anything like this is true of belief.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jenann Ismael (forthcoming). Freedom and Determinism. Philosophical Explorations.
Harold Langsam (2008). Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate. Erkenntnis 68 (1):79 - 101.
Jennifer M. Morton (2011). Toward an Ecological Theory of the Norms of Practical Deliberation. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):561-584.
David Owens (2002). Epistemic Akrasia. The Monist 85 (3):381-397.
Rico Vitz, Doxastic Voluntarism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Alfred R. Mele (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads54 ( #37,211 of 1,692,918 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #59,677 of 1,692,918 )
How can I increase my downloads?