Does belief have an aim?

Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305 (2003)
The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs.
Keywords Aim  Belief  Epistemology  Guessing  Purpose  Truth
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DOI 10.2307/4321407
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Conor McHugh (2012). Belief and Aims. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
Pascal Engel (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.

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