Epistemic Akrasia

The Monist 85 (3):381-397 (2002)
Abstract
One way of discerning what sort of control we have over our mental lives is to look at cases where that control is not exercised. This is one reason why philosophers have taken an interest in the phenomenon of akrasia, in an agent's ability to do, freely and deliberately, something that they judge they ought not to do. Akrasia constitutes a failure of control but not an absence of control. The akratic agent is not a compulsive; an akratic agent has the ability to control their action, to make it conform to their judgement, but they fail to exercise that ability. They freely and deliberately give in to temptation
Keywords epistemic akrasia
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Daniel Greco (2014). A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Philip J. Nickel (2010). Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334.

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