David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The Monist 85 (3):381-397 (2002)
One way of discerning what sort of control we have over our mental lives is to look at cases where that control is not exercised. This is one reason why philosophers have taken an interest in the phenomenon of akrasia, in an agent's ability to do, freely and deliberately, something that they judge they ought not to do. Akrasia constitutes a failure of control but not an absence of control. The akratic agent is not a compulsive; an akratic agent has the ability to control their action, to make it conform to their judgement, but they fail to exercise that ability. They freely and deliberately give in to temptation.
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Neil Levy (2007). Doxastic Responsibility. Synthese 155 (1):127 - 155.
Neil C. Manson (2012). Epistemic Restraint and the Vice of Curiosity. Philosophy 87 (02):239-259.
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