David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. Owens focuses on the arguments of Descartes, Locke and Hume--the founders of epistemology--and presents a critical discussion of the current trends in contemporary epistemology. He proposes that the problems we confront today - skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, and debates on epistemic justification can be tackled when we have understood the moral psychology of belief.
|Keywords||Belief and doubt Free will and determinism Reason|
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|Call number||BD215.O94 2000|
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Citations of this work BETA
Declan Smithies (2012). The Normative Role of Knowledge. Noûs 46 (2):265-288.
Pamela Hieronymi (2008). Responsibility for Believing. Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
Paul Silva (2015). The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2).
Jennifer Lackey (2007). Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know. Synthese 158 (3):345--361.
Anthony Robert Booth (2012). All Things Considered Duties to Believe. Synthese 187 (2):509-517.
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