Testimony and assertion

Philosophical Studies 130 (1):105 - 129 (2006)
Abstract
Two models of assertion are described and their epistemological implications considered. The assurance model draws a parallel between the ethical norms surrounding promising and the epistemic norms which facilitate the transmission of testimonial knowledge. This model is rejected in favour of the view that assertion transmits knowledge by expressing belief. I go on to compare the epistemology of testimony with the epistemology of memory.
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Brandom (1983). Asserting. Noûs 17 (4):637-650.
T. Burge (1998). Reason and the First Person U Knjizi Wright, C., Smith, B: C. And Macdonald, C. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.
Tyler Burge (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Charles Fried (1978). Right and Wrong. Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Joseph Shieber (2012). Against Credibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):1 - 18.

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