Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Books 45 (4):306-312 (2004)
|Abstract||We are often in no position to know whether p is true but, it is widely held, where we do know that p, we are always in a position to know that we know that p: knowledge is luminous. In Chapter 4 of Knowledge and Its Limits Williamson argues that knowledge is not luminous and with this conclusion in hand he hopes to see off the sceptic, amongst other things.|
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