David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009)
In its central use “phenomenology” names a movement in twentieth century philosophy. A second use of “phenomenology” common in contemporary philosophy names a property of some mental states, the property they have if and only if there is something it is like to be in them. Thus, it is sometimes said that emotional states have a phenomenology while belief states do not. For example, while there is something it is like to be angry, there is nothing it is like to believe that Paris is in France. Although the two uses of “phenomenology” are related, it is the first which is the current topic. Accordingly, “phenomenological” refers to a way of doing philosophy that is more or less closely related to the corresponding movement. Phenomenology utilizes a distinctive method to study the structural features of experience and of things as experienced. It is primarily a descriptive discipline and is undertaken in a way that is largely independent of scientific, including causal, explanations and accounts of the nature of experience. Topics discussed within the phenomenological tradition include the nature of intentionality, perception, time-consciousness, self-consciousness, awareness of the body and consciousness of others. Phenomenology is to be distinguished from phenomenalism, a position in epistemology which implies that all statements about physical objects are synonymous with statements about persons having certain sensations or sense-data. George Berkeley was a phenomenalist but not a phenomenologist. Although elements of the twentieth century phenomenological movement can be found in earlier philosophers—such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant and Franz Brentano—phenomenology as a philosophical movement really began with the work of Edmund Husserl. Following Husserl, phenomenology was adapted, broadened and extended by, amongst others, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Phenomenology has, at one time or another, been aligned with Kantian and post-Kantian transcendental philosophy, existentialism and the philosophy of mind and psychology. This article introduces some of the central aspects of the phenomenological method and also concrete phenomenological analyses of some of the topics that have greatly exercised phenomenologists.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Wolfgang Walter Fuchs (1976). Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence: An Essay in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Nijhoff.
Christopher E. Macann (1993). Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty. Routledge.
Michel Henry (2008). Material Phenomenology. Fordham University Press.
David Woodruff Smith & Amie Lynn Thomasson (eds.) (2005). Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Alva Noë (2007). The Critique of Pure Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):231-245.
Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (2007). Philosophical Issues: Phenomenology. In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. 67--87.
Tom Rockmore (2011). Kant and Phenomenology. University of Chicago Press.
Added to index2009-11-18
Total downloads65 ( #29,163 of 1,692,636 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #108,675 of 1,692,636 )
How can I increase my downloads?