A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs

Theory and Decision 53 (2):137-152 (2002)
Abstract
When preferences are such that there is no unique additive prior, the issue of which updating rule to use is of extreme importance. This paper presents an axiomatization of the rule which requires updating of all the priors by Bayes rule. The decision maker has conditional preferences over acts. It is assumed that preferences over acts conditional on event E happening, do not depend on lotteries received on Ec, obey axioms which lead to maxmin expected utility representation with multiple priors, and have common induced preferences over lotteries. The paper shows that when all priors give positive probability to an event E, a certain coherence property between conditional and unconditional preferences is satisfied if and only if the set of subjective probability measures considered by the agent given E is obtained by updating all subjective prior probability measures using Bayes rule
Keywords Ambiguous beliefs  Bayesian updating  Dynamic choice  Multiple priors  Uncertainty aversion
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