Externalisme, rationalité et explanandum de la psychologie intentionnelle

Dialogue 34 (02):237- (1995)
In The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor attempts to reconcile the idea that psychological laws are characteristically intentional with the idea that their implementation is typically computational. In order to do so, Fodor must show that narrow contents are superfluous for the purposes of psychological explanation and that Frege cases are rare and constitute unsystematic exceptions. The paper contends that the argument Fodor offers in order to establish his claim is flawed. It argues that the principle of informational equilibrium the argument is based on rests on an utterly implausible conception of the rationality of action
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