David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192 (2011)
Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that Gilbert’s account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and that Bratman’s account requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that I see as offering an alternative route to shared intention. I concentrate on Michael Bacharach’s version of team-agency theory, according to which shared agency is a matter of team-reasoning, team-reasoning depends on group identification and group identification is the result of processes of self-framing. I argue that it can yield an account of shared intention that is less normatively loaded and less cognitively demanding.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy of Mind Developmental Psychology Philosophy of Science Cognitive Psychology Epistemology Neurosciences|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll (2005). Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
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Michael Bacharach (2006). Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Mattia Gallotti & Chris Frith (2013). Social Cognition in the We-Mode. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
Olle Blomberg (2016). Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2013). Interacting Mindreaders. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863.
Elisabeth Pacherie (2013). Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite. Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
Angelica Kaufmann (2015). Animal Mental Action: Planning Among Chimpanzees. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):745-760.
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