David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialogue 42 (03):447- (2003)
I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, its dynamics and the rationality and time constraints that bear on it. I then try to show how the difficulties encountered by the causal theory can be solved within this new framework. 1
|Keywords||Philosophy of action Intention|
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References found in this work BETA
Kent Bach (1978). A Representational Theory of Action. Philosophical Studies 34 (4):361 - 379.
Robert Brandom (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press.
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Citations of this work BETA
Anja Berninger & Sabine Döring (2012). Emotion and Perception of One's Own Actions – A Comment on Wilke, Synofzik and Lindner. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):46-47.
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