David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577 (2006)
Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). Similarly, the Cotard delusion (which involves the belief that one is dead or unreal in some way) may stem from a general..
|Keywords||*Cognitions *Delusions *Experiences (Events) *Internal External Locus of Control *Phenomenology Models Psychological Theories|
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Maura Tumulty (2011). Delusions and Dispositionalism About Belief. Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.
Gilles Lafargue & Nicolas Franck (2009). Effort Awareness and Sense of Volition in Schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):277-289.
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