David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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I will concentrate on the 'executive' conception of intentions and intentional actions. I will argue that intentional bodily movements have distinctive observable characteristics that set them apart from non-intentional bodily motions. I will also argue that that when we observe an action performed by someone else, the perceptual representations we form contain information about the dynamics of movements and their relations to objects in the scene that can be exploited in order to identify at least the more basic intentions of the agent. In the final part of the paper, I will offer some suggestions as to how this capacity to perceive the actions of other agents as intentional relates to our capacity to recognize our own actions as intentional.
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Shannon Spaulding (2015). On Direct Social Perception. Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482.
John Michael & Leon De Bruin (2015). How Direct is Social Perception? Consciousness and Cognition 36:373-375.
John Michael, Wayne Christensen & Søren Overgaard (2013). Mindreading as Social Expertise. Synthese 191 (5):1-24.
Raphael van Riel (2008). On How We Perceive the Social World. Criticizing Gallagher's View on Direct Perception and Outlining an Alternative. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):544-552.
S. Gallagher (2008). Another Look at Intentions: A Response to Raphael van Riel's “On How We Perceive the Social World”. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):553-555.
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