Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (1):47-63 (2006)
|Abstract||: It is argued that Adam Smith criticizes David Hume's account of the origin of and continuing adherence to the rule of law for being not sufficiently Humean. Hume explained that adherence to the rule of law originated in the self-interest to restrain self-interest. According to Smith, Hume does not pay enough attention to the passions of resentment and admiration, which have their source in the imagination. Smith's offers a more naturalistic and evolutionary account of the psychological pre-conditions of the establishment and morality of justice than Hume had. Yet, Smith's account also makes room for a thin conception of Lockean natural right to property, while rejecting the contractualist and rationalistic elements in Locke. It emerges that Smith severs the intimate connection that Hobbes and Hume made between justice and property.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Robert C. Solomon (2004). Sympathy as a “Natural”. The Ruffin Series of the Society for Business Ethics 2004:53-58.
Michael S. Pritchard (2008). Justice And Resentment In Hume, Reid, And Smith. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):59-70.
Annette C. Baier (2006). Hume's Deathbed Reading. Hume Studies 32 (2):347-356.
Knud Haakonssen (1981). The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith. Cambridge University Press.
Graciela De Pierris (2002). Causation as a Philosophical Relation in Hume. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):499 - 545.
David M. Levy & Sandra J. Peart (2004). Sympathy and Approbation in Hume and Smith: A Solution to the Other Rational Species Problem. Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):331-349.
Sheldon Wein (1988). Humean Minds and Moral Theory. Philosophy Research Archives 14:229-236.
Jon Rick (2007). Hume's and Smith's Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (2):135-158.
Lorraine Besser-Jones (2006). The Role of Justice in Hume's Theory of Psychological Development. Hume Studies 32 (2):253-276.
E. Schliesser & S. Pack (2006). Smith's Humean Criticism of Hume's Account of the Origin of Justice. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (1):47-63.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads68 ( #15,773 of 722,861 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,861 )
How can I increase my downloads?