David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Susan Pockett (ed.), Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? MIT Press (2004)
In this paper, I shall offer a sketch of a dynamic theory of intentions. I shall argue that several categories or forms of intentions should be distinguished based on their different (and complementary) functional roles and on the different contents or types of contents they involve. I shall further argue that an adequate account of the distinctive nature of actions and of their various grades of intentionality depends on a large part on a proper understanding of the dynamic transitions among these different forms of intentions. I also hope to show that one further benefit of this approach is to open the way for a more perspicuous account of the phenomenology of action and of the role of conscious thought in the production of action
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Citations of this work BETA
Elisabeth Pacherie (2008). The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework. Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.
Shannon Spaulding (2015). On Direct Social Perception. Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482.
Erol Copelj (forthcoming). On Projecting and Willing: A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Intentions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
N. SebaNz & U. Lackner (2007). Who's Calling the Shots? Intentional Content and Feelings of Control. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):859-876.
Marcela Herdova (forthcoming). Are Intentions in Tension with Timing Experiments? Philosophical Studies:1-15.
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