David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 15 (4):400-432 (2000)
I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, its dynamics and the rationality and time constraints that bear on it. I then try to show how the difficulties encountered by the causal theory can be solved within this new framework. 1
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M. Synofzik, G. Vosgerau & A. Newen (2008). Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multi-Factorial Two-Step Account of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
Elisabeth Pacherie (2008). The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework. Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.
Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia (2014). Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
Pierre Jacob (2013). How From Action-Mirroring to Intention-Ascription? Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):1132-1141.
Bence Nanay (2012). Action-Oriented Perception. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):430-446.
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