Conference: The Admissible Contents of Experience

The Topic: Much work has been done on the nature of perceptual representation. Familiar debates surround questions about the content of perceptual experience, such as: Is the content wide or narrow? Is the content conceptual or non-conceptual? What is the relation between content and phenomenal character? However, a fundamental question that has not received a great deal of attention is what are the admissible contents of perceptual experience? Equivalently, what contents do perceptual experiences have? Or, which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience?
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Josefa Toribio (2002). Perceptual Experience and its Contents. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (4):375-392.
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