Is compositionality compatible with holism?

Mind and Language 12 (1):11-33 (1997)
Abstract
Peter Pagin Is the principle of semantic compositionality compatible with the principle of semantic holism? The question is of interest, since both principles have a lot that speaks for them, and since they do seem to be in conflict. The view that natural languages have compositional structure is almost unavoidable, since linguistic communication by means of new combinations of words would be virtually incomprehensible otherwise. And holism too seems generally plausible, since the meaning of an expression is directly connected with the way that expression interacts with other.
Keywords Composition  Holism  Language  Learning  Semantics
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Citations of this work BETA
Eli Dresner (2012). Meaning Holism. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):611-619.
Martin L. Jönsson (2014). Semantic Holism and Language Learning. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):725-759.
Philip Robbins (2001). What Compositionality Still Can Do. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):328-336.
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