Proper Names and Relational Modality

Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (5):507 - 535 (2006)
Saul Kripke's thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs, (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite descriptions. If one, like Kripke, accounts for this difference by means of the intensions of the names and the descriptions, the conclusion is that names do not in general have the same intension as any normal, identifying description. However, this difference can be accounted for alternatively by appeal to the semantics of the modal expressions. On the account we suggest, dubbed 'relational modality', simple singular terms, like proper names, contribute to modal contexts simply by their actual world reference, not by their descriptive content. That account turns out to be fully equivalent with the rigidity account when it comes to truth of modal and non-modal sentence (with respect to the actual world), and hence supports the same basic intuitions. Here we present the relational modality account and compare it with others, in particular Kripke's own
Keywords Actuality  Definite descriptions  Kripke  Modality  Necessity  Possible worlds semantics  Proper names  Rigid designators  Two-dimensionalism  Truth
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DOI 10.2307/29737177
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Jussi Haukioja (2012). Rigidity and Actuality-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):399-410.

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