Quine and the problem of synonymy
Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):171-197 (2003)
| Abstract | On what seems to be the best interpretation, what Quine calls 'the problem of synonymy' in Two Dogmas is the problem of approximating the extension of our pretheoretic concept of synonymy by clear and respectable means. Quine thereby identified a problem which he himself did not think had any solution, and so far he has not been proven wrong. Some difficulties for providing a solution are discussed in this paper. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,631 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Manfred Kupffer (2008). An Unintentional Defense of the Indeterminacy of Meaning? Erkenntnis 68 (2):225 - 238.
Charles Turek (1972). A Note on Quine's Synonymy. Journal of Critical Analysis 4 (2):85-86.
T. Parent (2008). Quine and Logical Truth. Erkenntnis 68 (1):103 - 112.
Arnold Cusmariu (1978). About Property Identity. Auslegung 5 (3):139-146.
Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1975). Quine’s Way Out. Analysis 36 (1):28-37.
Robert Barrett (1965). Quine, Synonymy and Logical Truth. Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):361-367.
Olaf Mueller (1998). Does the Quine/Duhem Thesis Prevent Us From Defining Analyticity? Erkenntnis 48 (1):85-104.
Olaf Mueller (1998). Does the Quine/Duhem Thesis Prevent Us From Defining Analyticity? On Fallacy in Quine. Erkenntnis 48 (1):81 - 99.
Peter Pagin (2001). A Quinean Definition of Synonymy. Erkenntnis 55 (1):7-32.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads43 ( #26,086 of 548,973 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,799 of 548,973 )How can I increase my downloads? |

