Rule-following, compositionality and the normativity of meaning

In D. Prawitz (ed.), Meaning and Interpretation. Konferenser (2002)
However, if Wittgenstein’s so called rule-following considerations are correct, then this reason for believing in the validity of (C), is mistaken. The conclusion of those considerations is that we must reject the idea that rules are things which determine possible cases of application before those cases are actually encountered and decided by speakers. If this is right, then there is no rule which determines the meanings of new sentences, i.e. before those sentences have actually been used. Therefore, it might seem that (C) is not valid for natural languages.
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